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lated the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum. The first part of the article examines
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In the present day, sanctions have become an indispensable instrument in the toolkit of the modern
welfare state. They lie at the core of the current approach to welfare conditionality which promotes
compliance with benefit conditions through the use of negative incentives: recipients who fail to
‘hold their end of the bargain’ are sanctioned by stopping their benefits. Since the 1990s, the
inflation of welfare conditionality has gone hand in hand with a notable expansion in the scope,
severity and incidence of benefit sanctions.1 In this landscape, the overwhelming majority2 of
European welfare states have embraced the 100% benefit reduction sanction – a complete suspen-
sion of welfare payments, like the sword of Damocles hanging above the heads of recipients of
social assistance. Citizens who (repeatedly) fail to comply with the increasingly rigid and difficult-
to-navigate rules of welfare conditionality can be denied nearly any form of social protection. The
situation of these individuals is aggravated by the duration of the sanctions, which can range
somewhere between several months (in Germany and the Netherlands) and an astonishing 36
months (in the United Kingdom).
At the same time, the potentially devastating effect of welfare sanctions on vulnerable groups of
individuals is increasingly being criticised. In his recent book Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
treatment? Benefit Sanctions in the UK, Adler asks why benefit sanctions are not a matter of
greater public concern, considering they are ‘so ineffective and cause so much suffering’.3 The
human suffering resulting from welfare sanctions was also the subject of Ken Loach’s 2016 film I,
Daniel Blake which emotionally touched viewers across European movie theatres. The film
portrayed the mental struggles benefit recipients must undergo when confronted with the rigid
system of rules and sanctions, and it culminated with the death of the main character who suffered a
heart attack. Unfortunately, such tragic events are not limited to the world of fictional movie
characters. The most extensive empirical research on the impact of welfare conditionality available
has concluded that welfare sanctions can ‘exacerbate[e] existing physical and mental illnesses and
[trigger] high levels of stress, anxiety and depression’ and, in a limited number of cases, provide a
fertile ground for suicidal thoughts.4 The negative impact of sanctions on the well-being of benefit
recipients is amplified by the ineffectiveness of these measures. Academic research concludes that
while benefit sanctions get claimants off benefits, they do not necessarily get them into paid work.
On the contrary, sanctions are proven to have a generally unfavourable impact on the longer-term
employment perspectives of individuals and furthermore cause spill-over effects by pushing ben-
efits recipients into homelessness or turning them into drug dealers.5
From a legal perspective, far-reaching benefit reductions have a strained relationship with the
right to a subsistence minimum which obliges states to provide minimum levels of assistance to all
vulnerable persons in need. This strained relationship has been subject of relatively little academic
research.6 The present article contributes to the existing body of knowledge by looking at welfare
1. Dwyer and Wright (2014); Vonk (2014); Eleveld (2016); Adler (2018), pp. 45-61; Eichenhofer (2015).
2. The following countries have adopted sanctions of 100% benefit reduction: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom; cf. Eleveld (2018), pp 463 et seq.
3. Adler (2018), p 9.
4. WelCond and Dwyer (2018), p 7; WelCond (2018), pp 19 et seq.
5. Griggs and Evans (2010); WelCond (2018), pp 18-19; Adler (2018), pp 73-86.
6. Notable exceptions here are Eleveld (2018); Eleveld (2016); for the German academic literature on this matter cf. note
19.
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sanctions in the light of recent judicial developments. It departs from the November 2019 judgment
of the German Constitutional Court which declared a large portion of the applicable regime
unconstitutional because it violated the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum.7 The
first part of the article examines this German basic right and the application of its normative
requirements by the Constitutional Court to welfare sanctions. Two important points of reference
are discussed which relate to the effectiveness of the measures and the availability of sanction
mitigation instruments that safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed subsistence minimum. The
second part of the article carries out an examination into the international human right to social
assistance and the respective case law by the international supervisory bodies. A comparative legal
analysis is carried out in the third part which highlights the similarities between the German and
the international legal approach to welfare sanctions. The article concludes with the observation
that welfare sanctions and the right to a subsistence minimum can only coexist under the condition
that states respect the absolute nature of minimum social protection and reconcile the adopted
measures with the primary objective of social assistance: reintegration and social inclusion.
2. Welfare sanctions in the German legal context
a). The German basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum
i) Historical development and legal framework. It may come as a surprise that the German Basic Law
of 1949 (Grundgesetz (GG)) was unfamiliar with the concept of social assistance as a human right.
The constitutional legislator refrained from including a respective provision in the catalogue of
protected basic rights (Articles 1-19 GG). Instead, the constitution which was designed to govern
the post-war legal order adopted in Article 20(1) GG a general declarative provision which
proclaims Germany as a social state. The provision assumes the responsibility of the German state
to set up the social arrangements necessary in a social state. This was the initial conception of
social assistance in Germany: a task to be fulfilled by the state where politics have the primacy.
This stance is clearly reflected in one of the early decisions of the BVerfG from 1951 in which the
Court reached the conclusion that neither the protection of human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) nor the
protection of physical integrity (Article 2(2) GG) conferred upon individuals a basic right to
adequate social protection by the state.8 This, however, did not mean that citizens were left behind
without any form of protection. The social state principle of Article 20(1) GG obliged the state to
adopt the social protection arrangements necessary in a social state. In extreme cases of arbitrary
shortcomings of the legislature, the Court did not exclude the possibility that individuals could turn
to the judiciary by means of a constitutional complaint.9
Two decades later, in the 1970s, the German Constitutional Court paved the way for a rights-
based approach to social assistance by accepting the existence of an unwritten basic right to a
guaranteed subsistence minimum.10 The constitutional anchor for this basic right was found in the
protection of the inviolable human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) in conjunction with the social state
7. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), cf. case note Gantchev (2019).
8. BVerfGE 1, 97 (19.12.1951).
9. Idem; cf. Mayen (2012), pp 1453-1454; Banafsche (2016), pp 231-232.
10. BVerfGE 40, 121 (18.06.1975); BVerfGE 45, 187 (21.06.1977). In a comparable development, the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court recognised in 1995 an unwritten basic right to a secure existence. In 1999, however, this right was
included in the revised Swiss Constitution; cf. Studer and Pärli (2020).
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principle (Article 20(1) GG) which, according to the Court, demand that the state guarantee to
every individual the means necessary for covering the subsistence minimum. The birth of this basic
right, however, did not immediately enhance the legal position of welfare recipients; individuals
could still not rely on it in court proceedings as a legal basis supporting their social assistance
claims. The Court held on to its view that it is primarily the task of the legislator to translate the
requirements of this abstract right into practice by enacting respective legislation, and that this
right can be invoked before courts only in very extreme cases of legislative idleness.11
In 2010, the Constitutional Court handed down a landmark judgment which recognised for the
first time the direct and subjective nature of the right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum.12 From
that point on, this right has been regarded as justiciable, meaning that it can be directly invoked
before national courts, albeit with one important caveat: individuals cannot base their actual
benefits claims on this right, but instead use it as a weapon to address legislative shortcomings.
In German academic literature, it is referred to as a right to a right.13 This well-thought approach of
the Constitutional Court addresses the relationship between government-run social policy and
basic rights in a subtle and constitutionally elegant manner. It highlights the primary task of the
legislator who remains responsible for adopting the social security arrangements necessary in a
social state. At the same time, however, the constitutional status of the right to a guaranteed
subsistence minimum effectively restricts the margin of appreciation of the national Parliament
in cases where mandatory minimum standards are neglected. Acts of Parliament that fail to comply
with the normative requirements can be challenged directly by individuals or by referring national
courts of justice which can trigger constitutional examination by the BVerfG. If the Constitutional
Court finds that the challenged Acts of Parliament do not meet the normative requirements, they
can be declared unconstitutional. As a legal consequence, the disputed provisions can be rendered
inapplicable, and the Court can oblige the legislator to adopt new legislation which remedies the
shortcomings. In some cases, the BVerfG may also adopt transitionary provisions which apply
until the improved legislation has entered into force.
In the past decade, the constitutional embedment of the right to a guaranteed subsistence
minimum has proven to be an effective instrument for steering deficient social policy and legis-
lation in the right direction. In the above-mentioned 2010 judgment, the BVerfG found that the
legislator did not determine the abstract needs necessary for calculating the amount of welfare
benefits paid (the so-called Regelsatz) in a statistically coherent manner, and requested that the
national Parliament adopt new legislation.14 In another remarkable case of 2012, the Court reached
the conclusion that the amount of assistance paid to asylum seekers was ‘obviously insufficient’ to
cover the guaranteed minimum subsistence costs, also considering that the level of benefits had not
been adjusted since 1993.15 Until a remedy had been adopted by the legislator, the Court declared
respective provisions from the general social assistance regime (Sozialhilfe) for applicable. A final
example to be mentioned here concerns the 2019 judgment in which the BVerfG found a large
portion of the welfare sanctions regime to be unconstitutional, which it replaced with transitional
regulation.16 The three cases mentioned highlight the delicate manoeuvres undertaken by the Court
11. Cf. Mayen (2012), pp 1453-1454; Banafsche (2016), p 232.
12. BVerfGE 125, 175 (09.02.2010); for an analysis of this judgment (in German) cf. Rixen (2010); Mayen (2012).
13. Mayen (2012), pp 1460-1461; cf. Drohsel (2014), p 98; Vonk and Olivier (2019), p 230.
14. BVerfGE 125, 175 (09.02.2010).
15. BVerfGE 132, 134 (20.06.2012).
16. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019).
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in order to substantiate the fragile balance between policy-driven legislation and rights-driven
minimum standards of social protection.
ii) Normative requirements. The basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum creates a set of
obligations of the state to support all individuals who do not dispose of the required means to cover
their subsistence costs. These obligations delineate the minimum level of public assistance which
must be granted to all persons in a social state. In this light, the right to a guaranteed subsistence
minimum cannot be equated to a more general right to social assistance, as it is known at in
international legal order. The question of which arrangements are necessary in order to deliver
adequate levels of public support is governed by the social state principle of Article 20(1) GG
which has a programmatic character. Without digging deeper into this dichotomy, it can be argued
that the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum forms a subset of core obligations of the
state which arise in the context of the social state principle.
The minimum protection character of the right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum influences
the scope of protection which is both wide and narrow. Having its constitutional anchor in the
protection of human dignity, this basic right has a very broad personal scope of application which
extends to every natural person. After all, the protection of human dignity has the status of a
universal, inviolable human right that can be enjoyed by all. This broad personal scope was
demonstrated in the 2012 judgment of the BVerfG where the Court applied the normative criteria
of the right to the situation of asylum seekers.17 At the same time, however, the material scope of
protection is very narrow: only the subsistence minimum is covered. According to the definition
applied by the German Constitutional Court, the subsistence minimum has two dimensions which
must be satisfied.18 The first one relates to the physical existence of the individual and covers the
means necessary for food, clothing, accommodation, heating, hygiene and health. The second
dimension is of socio-cultural nature and aims at establishing a basic level of participation in
social, cultural and political life. In the eyes of the BVerfG, these two dimensions must be secured
in an integral manner: the government cannot neglect the socio-cultural dimension by invoking the
argument that it has provided the means necessary for physical survival.19
b) Proportionality of welfare sanctions
i). Introduction to the 2019 BVerfG case. The relationship between welfare sanctions and the basic
right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum has been a long-disputed matter in German academic
literature.20 Despite the numerous academic contributions on this topic, there was no legal cer-
tainty regarding the constitutionality of welfare sanctions up until the 2019 judgment of the
Constitutional Court.21 The factual circumstances which gave rise to the case concern the reduc-
tion of the welfare benefits of an unemployed individual as a sanction for his repeated refusal to
accept suitable employment.22 The contested provisions for sanctioning non-compliance in the
17. BVerfGE 132, 134 (20.06.2012).
18. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 119.
19. Idem.
20. Cf. Neškovic and Erdem (2012); Drohsel (2014); Berlit (2013); Merold (2016); Burkiczak (2012); Neškovic and
Erdem (2012a).
21. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019); cf. case note Gantchev (2019).
22. For a thorough examination of the facts of the case cf. Gantchev (2019).
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German social assistance scheme known as Hartz IV are laid down in § 31a(1) and §§ 31b
Sozialgesetzbuch II (SGB II). According to § 31a(1) SGB II, every breach of claimant duties must
be punished with a benefits reduction of 30% for first offenders and 60% or 100% in cases of
recidivism.23 These sanctions have a mandatory character, meaning that the welfare administration
is legally obliged to always punish non-compliance by reducing benefit payments. Article § 31b(1)
SGB II pinpoints the duration of all sanctions at three months. Under this challenged legislation,
the only possibility to mitigate the negative effect of the imposed sanctions is created by Article
§31a(3) SGB II which regulates the provision of alternative forms of assistance. According to this
legal norm, the welfare administration can provide alternative forms of assistance such as benefits
in kind in the case of a 30% reduction, and must cover the expenses for accommodation and heating
when benefits are reduced by 60% or more.
In its 2019 judgment, the BVerfG approached the constitutionality of welfare sanctions by
examining whether the sanctioning regime is in accordance with the requirements of the basic
right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum. The tool applied by the Court is the well-known
proportionality test which is used to justify limitations of basic rights. In the context of the
proportionality test, the Court examined whether the contested measures are suitable, necessary
and proportionate in the strict sense for attaining a legitimate goal in the public interest.24 The most
important findings are summarised in the following subchapters.
ii). General observations on welfare conditionality and sanctions. The BVerfG began its constitutional
review of the contested measures with some general observations about the relationship between
welfare sanctions and the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum.25 The protection of the
inviolable human dignity, which is at the core of the state obligation to realise the required
minimum levels of social protection, is a universal right that can be enjoyed by all individuals
regardless of the question whether they display a ‘dignified’ behaviour.26 Accordingly, the right to
protection of human dignity must not be earned, instead it should be respected by the state
regardless of the personal characteristics or social status of a given individual. In other words,
the ability of an individual to secure his or her own subsistence is not a prerequisite for the
protection of human dignity by the state.
At the same time, however, the wide legislative margin of appreciation in social matters allows
the legislator to tie the provision of welfare benefits to the so-called subsidiarity principle, accord-
ing to which assistance must be granted only in cases where there is a real existing need.27 The
subsidiarity principle enables the state to attach conditions to the provision of social assistance
which are directed at increasing the capacity of individuals to overcome the situation of need by
themselves. Accordingly, claimant conditions which pursue the aim of social reintegration are not
incompatible with the right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum – on the contrary, they may help
the realisation of this basic right. In this light, the Constitutional Court drew an important line
between reintegrative measures and measures which aim at ‘improving’ the personality of welfare
claimants without bringing them any closer to the labour market. The latter are incompatible with
23. § 31a(1) SGB II establishes a stricter sanctioning regime for claimants who have not reached the age of 25.
24. Cf. on the application of the proportionality test on welfare sanctions: Drohsel (2014), pp 100-103; Merold (2016).
25. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 117-135.
26. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 120; cf. on the human dignity as dogmatic justification of the basic right to a
guaranteed subsistence minimum: Wallerath (2008); Drohsel (2014), pp 98-100.
27. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 124-128.
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the German Basic Law because, as the BVerfG put it, ‘there is no moral high ground of the state in
relation to benefits recipients’ which justifies the adoption of such ‘paternalistic’ measures.28
Moreover, the Court held that the legislator may use its margin of appreciation to pursue
compliance with benefits conditions by adopting negative incentives such as welfare sanctions.29
An important condition is that the state cannot use these measures for purely punitive purposes –
they must be effective in their primary objective which is to promote the fulfilment of claimant
duties and thereby to contribute to the reintegration of vulnerable individuals. With regard to the
reduction of benefits in particular, the BVerfG called for the necessary caution. The (partial)
suspension of welfare payments can deprive the concerned individuals of their constitutionally
guaranteed minimum subsistence means. Against the background of the personal hardship these
measures may cause, the Court decided to narrow down the wide margin of appreciation of the
legislator and to subject more severe welfare sanctions to a stricter proportionality test.30 Accord-
ingly, the BVerfG carried out a thorough constitutional examination which looked into the ques-
tion of whether the applicable sanctioning regime was suitable for attaining the goal of
reintegration, and whether less onerous measures were not available. Eventually, the Court reached
the conclusion that the applicable sanctioning regime failed the proportionality test because it
displayed two important deficiencies: its effectiveness had never been proven, and did not incor-
porate sufficient sanction mitigation instruments.
iii). The effectiveness of welfare sanctions. In its 2019 judgment, the Constitutional Court paid special
attention to the effectiveness of welfare sanctions.31 The BVerfG expressed its concern that despite
the legal duty of the state to examine the effects of the provision of social assistance benefits on a
regular basis,32 there had been no comprehensive examination of the effects of the German welfare
conditionality regime in §§ 31, 31a, 31b SGB II. The Court referred to a handful of German
empirical studies on the effectiveness of sanctions which it dismissed as inconsistent with respect
to their methods, how representative they are, and their results. The judges concluded that there
was no empirical evidence that the threat of sanctions had a positive effect on promoting com-
pliance with claimant duties. On the contrary, some studies pointed towards the conclusion that
sanctions may be counter-productive for the social reintegration of unemployed individuals and
highlighted the dangers of pushing vulnerable people into isolation, exclusion, destitution, home-
lessness or survival crime and further distancing them from the services of the welfare
administration.33
The doubts on the effectiveness of welfare sanctions influenced the application of the propor-
tionality test in the case at hand. In the first step of the test, the BVerfG examined whether the
measures are suitable for attaining the desired goal of promoting compliance with claimant duties.
Generally speaking, the wide margin of appreciation of the national Parliament allows it to assess
the factual circumstances and to choose the means for achieving the goal of the legislation. In the
present case, however, the BVerfG found that this margin of appreciation must be reduced due to
the impact of the contested measures on the constitutionally guaranteed minimum and due to the
28. Ibid, sec 127.
29. Ibid, sec 129-135.
30. Idem.
31. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 55-67.
32. Cf. § 55(2) SGB II.
33. BVerfG 1 BvL 7/16 (05.11.2019), sec 65.
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fact that the legislator had had more than sufficient time to carry out reliable empirical research on
the effects of the welfare sanctions since their adoption.34 The Court examined the three levels of
sanctions separately, being more lenient in its review of the 30% benefit reduction and becoming
increasingly rigorous when examining the 60% and 100% sanctions.35 In the context of the 30%
benefit reduction, the Court accepted the suitability of this measure based on the assumption of its
effectiveness with the argument that the negative impact on basic rights remains, here, within
limits. The outcome, however, was a different one in the case of the 60% and 100% sanctions. In
the eyes of the Court, a reduction of this extent evidently deprives individuals of their subsistence
means, especially considering the very low level of benefits under Hartz IV which, as the Court
noted, are ‘barely sufficient’ to cover the constitutionally guaranteed minimum in the first place.36
Taking into account the devastating effects such severe sanctions can have on vulnerable groups
of individuals, the BVerfG found that the legislator can no longer rely on plausible assumptions
that these measures are effective. Instead, the effectiveness of the 60% and the 100% sanctions
must be proven by sufficiently reliable empirical studies. Having failed the proportionality test,
the Court declared the 60% and 100% benefit reductions unconstitutional and conferred on the
legislator the duty to adopt new legislation to replace them. In the meantime, the German welfare
administration is no longer allowed to punish (repeated) non-compliance by reducing benefit
levels by more than 30%.
iv). Sanction mitigation instruments. Another important point of concern raised by the Constitutional
Court addressed the rigid nature of the German sanctioning system. Under the applicable rules,
every non-compliance with claimant conditions must be punished by a benefits reduction which
has a duration of three months. The contested legislation does not leave any margin of appreciation
for the welfare administration to refrain from imposing a sanction in an individual case, where this
would be counterproductive for the reintegration of the benefits claimant. The BVerfG pointed out
that this rigidity gave rise to an inconsistent sanctioning practice.37 The Court referred to com-
prehensive studies which suggest that the most important factor behind the question of whether a
sanction is imposed is the particular regional institution which is handling the claim. According to
these studies, the sanctioning rate varied across the various social administration institutions with
regards to the age, qualification, sex and living situation of the claimant, as well as the labour
market conditions. In many cases, the welfare administration is reported to award itself legally
non-existent discretion by not imposing mandatory sanctions in cases where they are expected to
have the counter-productive effect of increasing individual hardship.38
According to the BVerfG, the mandatory nature of the sanctioning regime prevented the welfare
administration from refraining from imposing a sanction in cases where this would be counter-
productive for the reintegration of the individual.39 In the eyes of the Court, case workers should be
able to decide against imposing a sanction when the circumstances of the case demand this. The
Court pointed out that reducing the benefits of people with psychological problems or individuals
who are hardly employable is ineffective and contrary to the aim of reintegration. Accordingly, the
34. Ibid, sec 134.
35. Cf. 30% sanction: Ibid, sec 158-188; 60% sanction: Ibid, sec 189-200; 100% sanction: Ibid, sec 201-209.
36. Ibid, sec 190.
37. Ibid, sec 58.
38. Ibid, sec 67.
39. Ibid, sec 176, 181, 184-185, 207.
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Court found that the mandatory nature of the sanctions in § 31(1) SGB II failed every step of the
proportionality test. The legislator had several possible courses of action: it could adopt discre-
tionary clauses allowing the administration to refrain from imposing sanctions that would obvi-
ously be ineffective, or introduce a hardship clause which spared the sanction in individual cases to
avoid personal hardship.40 Until the legislator has remedied the unconstitutionality of the provi-
sion, the Court announced that § 31(1) must be interpreted in a way that includes both a discre-
tionary clause and a hardship clause.
Finally, the BVerfG addressed the fixed duration of the benefit sanctions which is set at three
months.41 Once again, the judges found the legislative framework to be insufficiently flexible to
cater to the needs of individual cases. It created no incentives for sanctioned individuals to alter
their behaviour and become compliant before the sanction was lifted. Instead of promoting com-
pliance with claimant duties, lengthy sanctions can create disincentives and even cause unem-
ployed individuals to terminate their contact with the welfare state. Against this background, the
Court did not accept that the fixed duration of three months is suitable or necessary for achieving
the aim of the sanction. The constitutional requirements allow the state to withhold the provision of
the guaranteed minimum only when and insofar unemployed individuals do not comply with their
duty to cooperate. The Court declared that the duration of sanctions was unconstitutional and
decided to inject a reparation clause into the respective provision. Under this clause, the welfare
administration can suspend the effect of the sanction before the three months have lapsed in cases
where sanctioned individuals have declared that they are ‘seriously and sustainably’ willing to
fulfil their claimant duties.
3. Welfare sanctions in international legal context
a. The international human right to social assistance
i). Historical development and legal framework. While the German Constitution does not recognise a
basic right to social assistance as such, this right is well established in the international legal
order. The right to social assistance belongs to the cluster of international social rights which
emerged in the aftermath of WWII. The recognition of social human rights marked an important
turning point at which poverty relief shifted from a charitable act to a state obligation. As the
European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) puts it, states ‘are not merely empowered to grant
assistance as they think fit; they are under an obligation which they may be called on in court to
honour’.42 Although the traditional doctrine views social rights as unenforceable soft law, this is
not a reason to disregard their importance. In the last decades, the international supervisory
bodies have adopted valuable ‘case law’ which has shed light on the normative requirements of
the social rights.
The right to social assistance can be found in various shapes in the international legal order.
Some legal instruments recognise it as an independent right, while others see it as part of the
encompassing right to social security.43 In both cases, it fulfils the same fundamental purpose of
assuming an obligation of the state to provide social protection to needy persons who are unable to
40. Ibid, sec 185.
41. Ibid, sec 177, 181, 184, 208.
42. ECSR (1969), Conclusions I, Statement of Interpretation on Article 13(1) of the ESC, pp. 65-67.
43. Vonk and Olivier (2019), p 220.
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take care of themselves in any other way.44 In 1944, Article 22 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) proclaimed that ‘[e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization [ . . . ] of the economic, social and cultural rights indispen-
sable for his dignity and the free development of his personality’. This right is supported by
Article 25(1) UDHR which guarantees an adequate standard of living for all individuals, includ-
ing food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services, as well as protection in
the event of a social risk such as unemployment. In the 1960s, the right to social assistance was
further consolidated in two international human rights frameworks: the European Social Charter
(ESC) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In the
wording of Article 9 ICESCR, state parties recognise the right of everyone to social security.
According to the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), this right
includes an obligation of states to work towards a non-contributory safety net.45 Article 13 ESC,
on the other hand, recognises an independent right to social assistance which assumes the state
obligation to grant adequate assistance to any person who lacks adequate resources. Another
international instrument in the area of minimum social protection which should be mentioned
here is the 2012 ILO Recommendation on national floors of protection which contains some
explicit references to social assistance. Finally, scholars have been discussing the noteworthy
possibility of finding a legal basis for the state duty to realise minimum levels of social protec-
tion in the European Convention of Human Rights, however, this possibility has thus far proven
to be severely limited.46
ii) Normative requirements. The right to social assistance guarantees individuals without suffi-
cient resources access to adequate levels of public support.47 Accordingly, the central criter-
ion for eligibility is that of need. The definition of what constitutes adequate resources differs
across the different human rights frameworks. Under Article 9 ICESCR, adequate support is
defined in abstract terms as the amount and duration of the benefits, whether in cash or in
kind, which allow everyone to realise their rights to family protection and assistance.48 Under
Article 13 ESC, the threshold for receiving assistance corresponds to what is necessary to live
a decent life and meet basic needs in an adequate manner.49 While the broad definition of
adequate benefits provides states with sufficient discretion to determine the levels of support
in accordance with the available resources and national social policy choices, the requirement
to guarantee the subsistence minimum has a mandatory character. In its General Comment
No. 19 on the right to social security, the CESCR refers to this requirement as the primary
core obligation of states under Article 9 ICESCR:
To ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits to all
individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential health care, basic shelter and
housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education.
44. Idem.
45. Vonk and Olivier (2019), p 223.
46. Koch (2009); Leijten (2017); Leijten (2019).
47. Cf. Vonk and Olivier (2019).
48. CESCR (2007), General Comment No. 19, par 22.
49. ESCR (2006), Conclusions XIII-4, Statement of Interpretation on Article 13(1), pp 54-57.
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The wording of this core obligation reflects the broad, quasi-universal personal scope (‘all
individuals and families’)50 and the narrow material scope of the covered needs. With regard to
the latter, the CESCR pursues an absolute definition by enumerating specific basic needs which
must be provided for: essential healthcare, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, food-
stuffs, and basic forms of education.
b). Admissibility of sanctions
i). General observations. The mandatory nature of the guaranteed subsistence minimum as a core
component of the right to social assistance raises the question of whether governments may tie the
provision of benefits assistance to the fulfilment of claimant duties and limit public support as a
sanction for non-compliance. The supervisory bodies address this matter using a careful, yet firm,
differentiation. According to the CESCR, eligibility criteria are only compatible with Article 9
ICESCR under the condition that they are reasonable, proportionate and transparent.51 Further-
more, ‘[t]he withdrawal, reduction or suspension of benefits should be circumscribed, based on
grounds that are reasonable, subject to due process, and provided for in national law’.52 To the
extent where the measures do not affect the guaranteed subsistence minimum, welfare sanctions
can be considered compatible with the right to social assistance. Once this threshold is exceeded,
however, the CESCR is clear that the imposed sanctions are no longer admissible: ‘Under no
circumstances should an individual be deprived of a benefit on discriminatory grounds or of the
minimum essential level of benefits’.53 The ECSR has addressed this question in similar terms:
The establishment of a link between social assistance and a willingness to seek employment or to
receive vocational training is in keeping with the Charter, in so far as such conditions are reasonable
and consistent with the aim pursued, that is to say to find a lasting solution to the individual’s
difficulties. Reducing or suspending social assistance benefits can only be in conformity with the
Charter if it does not deprive the person concerned of his/her means of subsistence.54
ii). The effectiveness of welfare sanctions. The effectiveness of welfare sanctions is not a central topic
of the case law of the international supervisory bodies. This can be explained against the back-
ground of the wide margin of appreciation which states traditionally enjoy when designing social
policy objectives and deciding which means are suitable to achieve them. Nonetheless, the bodies
have indirectly touched upon the matter with some general observations. Under Article 13 ESC,
the CESCR has reiterated on several occasions in its Conclusions of 2006 and 2013 that benefit
conditions must be reasonable and consistent with the objective of finding a long-term solution to
the individual’s problems.55 The formulation of this requirement creates the impression that the
Committee applies it only in the context of claimant conditions, and not to welfare sanctions. It
50. Cf. Eleveld (2018), p 453.
51. CESCR (2007), General Comment No. 19, par 24.
52. CESCR (2007), General Comment No. 19, par 24.
53. CESCR (2007), General Comment No. 19, par 78.
54. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 06 December 2017, Norway, 2013/def/NOR/13/1/EN.
55. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 30 June 2006, Estonia, 2006/def/EST/13/1/EN; ECSR Conclusions, decision of 30 June
2006, Portugal, 2006/def/PRT/13/1/EN; ECSR Conclusions, decision of 06 December 2017, Andorra, 2013/def/AND/
13/1/EN; ECSR Conclusions, decision of 06 December 2017, Norway, 2013/def/NOR/13/1/EN.
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might, however, also be the case that the ECSR has been addressing the body of conditions and
sanctions as a whole. An indication for this can be found in the 2013 Conclusions on Hungary,
where the Committee adopted the following wording: ‘[ . . . ] in so far as such conditions are
reasonable and consistent with the aim pursued, that is to say to find a lasting solution to the
individual’s difficulties, without depriving the person concerned of his/her means of subsis-
tence’.56 While speaking solely about claimant conditions, the Committee implicitly addressed
welfare sanctions in the last part of the consideration. Traces of the question on effectiveness can
also be found in the documents adopted by the CESCR under Article 9 ICESCR. In its General
Comment No. 19, the Committee highlighted the requirement that welfare sanctions must be based
on grounds which are reasonable. Although it is not clear what criteria the CESCR attaches to the
reasonableness requirement, it could be argued that welfare sanctions which do not effectively
promote compliance with conditions or do not enhance the reintegration of the individual cannot
be considered reasonable.
iii). Sanction mitigation instruments. The impact welfare of sanctions on the guaranteed subsistence
minimum is a matter which has received a considerable amount of attention by the international
supervisory bodies. As discussed above, both the ICESCR and the ECSR draw a red line with
regards to benefit reductions which touch upon the guaranteed minimum: ‘Under no circum-
stances’57 can such measures be brought in conformity with the right to social assistance. The
absolute nature of this requirement suggests that Member States could not adopt legislation which
limits public support to levels which are lower than the prescribed mandatory minimum, let alone
to completely suspend welfare payments. In practice, however, this requirement has proven to have
a more flexible nature. The case law of the ECSR under Article 13 ESC shows that the Committee
does not examine national welfare sanctions in absolute terms. Accordingly, the mere existence of
the possibility of even a full 100% benefit reduction does not automatically render the measure
incompatible with the right to social assistance. Instead, the Committee is much more interested in
the net effect of the sanctioning system on individuals. If states can demonstrate that sanctioned
individuals can access the necessary means to cover their existence minimum in alternative ways,
then the national system could still be in conformity with the right to social assistance.58 One way
to do so is by creating the possibility to grant hardship payments to vulnerable individuals who
have had their benefits reduced or suspended. The ECSR has inquired as to the existence of such
hardship payments in national systems on multiple occasions. In its 2013 and 2017 Conclusions,
the Committee asked the government of Portugal to confirm that individuals who have their
welfare payments suspended are eligible to receive exceptional short-term benefits of limited
amounts which cover the levels of the subsistence minimum.59 And in the cases of the United
Kingdom, Lithuania, and Romania, the ECSR devoted special attention to the availability of
hardship clauses which mitigate the effect of the imposed sanctions.60 A second type of sanction
mitigation instrument which the ECSR has started exploring recently is the good reasons clause. In
56. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 06 December 2013, Hungary, 2013/def/HUN/13/1/EN.
57. CESCR (2007), General Comment No. 19, par 78.
58. Cf. Eleveld (2018).
59. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 08 December 2017, Portugal, 2017/def/PRT/13/1/EN; cf. Eleveld (2018), p 455.
60. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 08 December 2017, Romania, 2017/def/ROU/13/1/EN; ECSR Conclusions, decision of
08 December 2017, UK, XXI-2/def/GBR/13/1/EN; ECSR Conclusions, decision of 08 December 2017, UK, XXI-2/
def/GBR/13/1/EN; cf. Eleveld (2018), p 455.
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its 2017 Conclusions on the Czech Republic, the Committee noted that the national legislation in
question allows the competent authority to grant assistance to sanctioned individuals on a case-by-
case basis, if there are good reasons to do so or when the person would be at risk of serious bodily
harm.61
4. Comparative analysis
The examination above helps reveal the striking similarities in the approaches of the German and
the international legal order to minimum social protection and welfare sanctions. In the first place,
the legal frameworks of both systems recognise a right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum
which is part of a more encompassing concept of social protection. In Germany, this parent concept
is the social state principle which assumes the duty of the legislator to adopt the arrangements
necessary for an adequate protection in a social state. While the German Basic Law does not
recognise an independent right to social assistance as such, the protection of human dignity in a
social state creates an unwritten legal basis for the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum
which can be invoked by individuals before courts to challenge shortcomings of the system. In the
international dimension, the right to social assistance is recognised by a range of frameworks as an
independent human right, or as part of the right to social security. This human right requires states
to realise adequate levels of social protection. The state duty to provide individuals in need with the
means necessary to realise the subsistence minimum represents a mandatory core obligation within
the parent right to social assistance.
In the second place, the scope of protection granted by the right to a guaranteed subsistence
minimum is similar in the German and in the international context. The fundamental nature of this
right renders it broad and (quasi-)universal in its personal scope, and very limited in its material
scope. It guarantees the means necessary for basic goods such as food, shelter, heating, clothing
and basic forms of healthcare and education. In Germany, the granted protection extends beyond
the physical dimension to also cover a basic level of participation in the social, cultural and
political life.
In the third place and most importantly for the purposes of this article, the judicial bodies
supervising the respective human rights frameworks have developed a similar approach for recon-
ciling welfare sanctions with the mandatory requirements of minimum social protection. They
reserve sufficient margin of appreciation which enables the legislator to make the provision of
social assistance dependent on the fulfilment of claimant duties which pursue reintegrative pur-
poses. Furthermore, the legislator is allowed to promote compliance with these duties by adopting
a system of negative incentives such as welfare sanctions. At the point, however, that the imposed
sanctions interfere with the guaranteed subsistence minimum, the supervisory bodies become
increasingly strict in their examination. The effectiveness of welfare sanctions represents the first
point of reference which is especially prominent in the German legal context.62 The German
Constitutional Court is prepared to accept severe benefit reductions, however under the condition
that the legislator has based these intrusive sanctions on comprehensive empirical research which
61. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 06 December 2017, Czech Republic, XX-2/def/CZE/13/1/EN.
62. The effectiveness of welfare sanctions is becoming a relevant factor also in other European countries. In Denmark,
following a principle decision of the Council of Appeal, municipalities are now required to assess whether a given
sanction will promote the recipient’s availability with regard to work or education; cf. Eleveld, Harris and Schøler
(2020), p 125.
Gantchev 269
supports the argument that these are effective measures for promoting compliance with claimant
duties and reintegration. The second point of reference for the examination of welfare sanctions is
the availability of sanction mitigation instruments. Both in Germany and in the international legal
order, the respective judicial bodies do not categorically prohibit states from sanctioning non-
compliance with welfare duties using far-reaching benefit reductions. Instead, they examine
whether the sanctioning system is sufficiently flexible to protect vulnerable individuals who face
deprivation of their subsistence minimum. In practice, such flexibility can be created by adopting
sanction mitigation instruments. In Germany, the recent judgment of the BVerfG corrected the
unconstitutionality of the sanctioning system by introducing three types of mitigation instruments:
a hardship clause, a discretionary clause and a reparation clause. And in the international legal
context, the case law of the ECSR has highlighted the importance of hardship clauses and good
reason clauses.
In her inspiring research, Eleveld argues that states should implement four types of mitigation
instruments in their sanctioning regimes in order to prevent the violation of the right to a minimum
means of subsistence: hardship clauses, reparatory clauses, good reasons clauses and discretionary
clauses.63 The 2019 judgment of the German Constitutional Court, which was announced about a
year later, is well-aligned with her argument. Eleveld examined the adoption of work-related
sanctions and mitigation instruments in 25 European welfare states to reach the alarming finding
that there is a reverse relationship between the strictness of the work-related sanction and the
number of mitigation clauses. She calls this the ‘sanction mitigation paradox’: ‘[I]n those countries
where, from a social rights perspective, mitigation clauses are needed the most, they are hardly or
not regulated in social assistance legislation’.64
Conclusion
In the present landscape of the modern welfare state, welfare sanctions and the right to a guaran-
teed subsistence minimum are experiencing a troubled marriage. Following a long period of
uncertainty, recent case law of the national and international judicial bodies has finally shed light
on the question of whether the two are at all capable of coexisting: they are. However, their
continued marriage is only possible if welfare sanctions respect the inclusive purpose of social
assistance and the mandatory character of minimum social protection. The legal developments
described in this article exemplify the judicial response to the omnipresent uninterrupted expansion
of welfare conditionality which has been taking place in recent decades. Founded on the narrative
of the Giddens’s Third Way politics – that the balance between rights and responsibilities of
welfare recipients needed to be rethought,65 activation policies have drifted away towards the
extreme of responsibilities. It almost seems as if the adopted measures have completely forgotten
about the rights dimension of social assistance. Interventions like the one by the German Consti-
tutional Court tip the scales back into balance by strengthening the rights-based approach to social
protection. These judicial interventions are subtle – their aim is not to make social policy, but to
soften its sharp edges instead. Accordingly, judicial bodies respect the choice of the legislator to
use welfare sanctions as a tool for promoting compliance with supposedly reintegrative claimant
63. Eleveld (2018).
64. Ibid, p 470.
65. Giddens (1998).
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duties. However, by subjecting more severe measures to a stricter scrutiny of their impact on
vulnerable groups of individuals and on the mandatory levels of minimum social protection, these
interventions mitigate the negative effects of the adopted policy measures and reconcile them with
the root objective of the welfare state: social inclusion and reintegration.
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